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VOTING ON THE BUDGET DEFICIT 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes a model  in which different rational  individuals  vote 
over  the composition and time profile of public  spending.  Potential 
disagreement  between current and future majorities  generates  instability  in 
the social choice function that aggregates  individual preferences.  In 
equilibrium a majority of  the voters may favor a budget  deficit.  The size  of 
the deficit under majority rule tends to be larger the greater  is the 
polarization  between current and potential future majorities.  The paper also 
shows  that the ex-ante efficient  equilibrium of  this model  involves  a balanced 
budget.  A balanced budget amendment,  however, is not durable under majority 
rule. 
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NBER  and CEPR  NBER  and CEPR 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Opinion polls show that American voters are well  aware  of  the Federal 
budget deficit, and disapprove  of it.  However,  there are clear  indications 
that it  is politically very  difficult  to  reach an agreement  about how to 
balance the budget.  In particular,  several polls show  that even though voters 
dislike deficits, they are not in favor of any specific measure which would 
reduce them.1 
Two explanations  for this apparent  inconsistency of opinions  are commonly 
proposed.  One is that voters do not understand  the concept of  budget 
constraint, and suffer  from "fiscal illusion'.  However,  it is quite difficult 
to reconcile this notion with the standard assumption of individual 
rationality.2  The other  is that disagreement amongst  voters generates  cycling 
and prevents the existence of a stable majority.  As a result,  individual 
preferences about intertemporal  fiscal  policy cannot be aggregated  in  a 
consistent way, and no  action  can be taken to balance the budget.  However, 
this argument fails to  explain why the absence of a stable  political 
equilibrium should result  in a budget deficit, rather  than in  a surplus or a 
balanced budget: in principle,  it seems  than any outcome could be observed  if 
the political equilibrium  is indeterminate. 
This  paper provides an  alternative  explanation of budget  deficits which 
is  not based on either  individual  irrationality or  non existence  of 
equilibrium.  The central  ingredient  of our explanation  is the inability  of 
current voters  to bind  the choices of  future voters.  This inability,  coupled 
with  potential disagreement  between  the current and future majorities, 
introduces a time inconsistency  in the dynamic social choice  problem that 
determines  the size of budget  deficits:  the policies desired by the current 
majority would not be carried out if  future majorities  exhibit different 
preferences.  The awareness  of this possibility may induce  the current 
majority to  run a budget  deficit  in excess of what would  be  ex—ante optimal 
for society as a whole.  This explains why it is hard to  agree on how to 
eliminate deficits,  even if  there  is a consensus that they may be socially 
sub—optimal. 
Our results have  a simple  economic  intuition.  Consider a rational voter 
who is presented with  a number  of  options on how to  allocate  the budget 
amongst alternative  uses.  Suppose  further that he is uncertain  about how future majorities  would choose amongst these same  options in subsequent 
periods.  In such  a  situation,  the rational current voter may be in favor  of 
budget deficits.  The costs of running current deficits are not fully 
internalized by  today's voter, not because of his irrationality, but because 
of  his awareness  that future policy choices might not reflect his 
preferences.  In other  words, the expected marginal  disutility of having to 
reduce spending  in the future, to repay the debt incurred today,  is not 
sufficiently high.  As a result, he  votes  in favor  of  fiscal deficits. 
The paper  also  shows that, in this  model, a balanced—budget  is the ex— 
ante optimal policy.  That is,  if  the size of  the deficit  is chosen  behind  a 
"veil of ignorance"  on  how the debt  proceeds are spent,  then the voters are 
unanimous  in choosing  a balanced—budget.  This implies that current voters 
would like to precommit governments  in the distant future  to a balanced  budget 
rule.  However, no current majority wants  the rule  to be  binding on itself. 
Thus, a balanced-budget  rule is enforceable only if  a qualified majority  is 
required to  abrogate  it.  This  constraint may imply a suboptimal  lack  of 
flexibility  in reacting to unexpected  events.  Therefore,  in this situation  as 
in many  others, society has to choose  on the tradeoff  between 'rules  and 
discretion." 
Our results are related to those of  other papers on  intertemporal 
politico—economic models  of fiscal  policy.  In  particular,  Alesina—Tabellini 
(1987a) and Tabellini  (1987) analyze a general equilibrium  model  in  which  two 
ideologically motivated  parties randomly alternate  in office and disagree  on 
the optimal composition of public  spending.  Alesina—Tabellini  (1987b) study a 
similar problem for an  open economy in which  the disagreement  is  about  the 
level of  transfers  and taxation of different constituencies.  Persson-Svensson 
(1987) consider  a "conservative"  government who is certain to be replaced  in 
the future by a  more "liberal" successor.  In these earlier papers as in  the 
present one, public debt is a strategic variable  used by the current 
policymaker  to influence  the actions of future policymakers.  In this earlier 
work, however,  either the political  equilibrium was exogenously  given,  or 
voters had to choose  between two alternative  policies,  presented to them  by 
two ideological  candidates.  In equilibrium both  candidates  chose the same 
deficit, even though they  chose a different level and/or  composition  of 
government spending  and taxation.  Thus, voters  did not have  a choice on  the 
deficit.  The  present  paper improves the characterization  of'  the political 
2 equilibrium by  assuming  that there are no  constraints on the policy options 
that can be  voted on.  In particular,  here voters explicitly  vote on the 
deficit.  To put it differently,  in this paper there is  "free entry" of 
candidates with different  policy proposals. 
The idea that state  variables can be  used to influence future voting 
outcomes can provide important  insights in understanding  other public choice 
problems, besides those concerning budget deficits.  For example, Glazer 
(1987) exploits this insight to investigate the choice of  durability  in public 
capital projects.  He  shows  that uncertainty about  future voting  outcomes 
generates a  bias  towards overinvesting  in long run projects.  Several other 
potentially  fruitful applications of  this idea come to  mind,  such as to 
provatization decisions  or to  defense policy  issues. 
Finally,  it should  also  be  noted that our argument  is markedly different 
from  the idea that deficits  occur because the current generation  does  not 
internalize the costs of future generations:  in our model  everybody  has the 
same time horizon.  Cukierman—Meltzer  (1986) provide a different  political 
explanation of  budget  deficits, based upon intergenerational  redistributions. 
They show that today's voters  choose deficits to  tilt the time profile of 
disposable  income  in their favor.  These two approaches  are by no  means 
contradictory, and they can both  contribute  to a politico—economic  theory of 
budget deficits based upon  general equilibrium  optimizing  models. 
The rest  of  the paper  is organized as  follows.  Section  2 describes  the 
basic model.  The political  equilibrium  is computed  in Section  3.  Section  14 
discusses the implications  of  these results for the issue of  budget  balance 
amendments.  The last  section briefly summarizes  the results and suggests 
several extensions. 
2.  THE  MODEL 
A group of  heterogeneous  individuals has to decide  by  majority  rule  on 
the production  of  two kinds of  public  goods, g and f.  The group  is endowed 
with  one unit  of  output  in each  period, and it can borrow  or lend to the rest 
of  the world at a given  real interest rate, for notational  simplicity  taken  to 
be  0.  The world lasts  two periods, and all debt  outstanding has to be repaid 
in full  at  the end of the second period.  Thus,  the group  faces the inter- 
temporal constraint: 
3 o  u'(g2) 
— 
(1—a)  u'(1—b—g2) 
0  (3) 
Equations  (3) and (ib) implicitly  define the equilibrium values  g; and f2 
as a 
function of a  and b.  Let us indicate these functions as  g2  G(a, b)  and 
= 
1-b—g2  F(a,  b).  Applying the implicit function theorem to  (3)  and 
(ib), it can be  shown  that, for  DSm>O, G  —F  >  0,  and —1<G <0,  —iKE <0,  2  a  a  b  b 
where Ga Gb, Fm  and Fb denote  the partial derivatives of  G(-) and F()  with 
respect to a  and b respectively.  It can also  be  shown that: 
-R(f  )  -R(g)  2  F:  (11)  b 
R(g2)+R(f2) 
b  R(g2)+R(12) 
where  R(•) is the coefficient of  absolute risk aversion of  u(.); thus R() 
—u'(  .)/u (.) 
For future  reference,  this interior optimum is illustrated  in the diagram 
of  Figure  1.  The downward  sloping line denotes the cpportunity  set faced by 
the median  voter in  period 2, as a function of  the debt  inherited from  the 
past, b.  The equilibrium  in period 2 occurs at  point E, where  the median 
voter's indifference curve  is tangent to his budget  line.  The upwards sloping 
line  EP2 is the median  voter's  income expansion path.  It traces out the 
equilibrium  combinations  of g2  and f2 as  b varies.  The income expansion path 
is not necessarily  linear: Using  (14),  its slope is given by R(g)/R(f).  With 
decreasing  absolute risk  aversion  (R  K  0), this slope  is greater than  1  if  F 
lies above the 1450  line (i.e.,  if a 
> ,  as  in Figure  1);  it is smaller than 
1  if  E lies below  the 1450  line (i.e., if  >  fl.  The opposite holds  if u(-) 
exhibits  increasing absolute  risk aversion.  Thus,  except  in the limit case of 
constant absolute  risk aversion,  the equilibrium  composition of  public 
spending  is  affected by the size  of  debt inherited from the past, b.  in  the 
plausible case  of decreasing  absolute risk aversion, a larger  value of b 
implies a more  balanced  composition of g  and f, for any given  value of' the 
median  voter preferences  (except in the case  r fl.  Conversely, a smaller 
value  of b drives  the equilibrium  away from  the 145°  line,  and hence brings 
about a  more  unbalanced  composition of g  and f, for any given cz 
Throughout  the paper, we define  a  more (less) balanced,  composition  as one 
defined  by  a point  in Figure  1,  less (more) distant from the 145°  line. This 
6 effect of  public  debt on the second period equilibrium  composition of 
expenditures plays  a major  role  in the next section, where the incentives to 
issue public debt in the first period are analyzed. 
Finally, if instead  1  or a  0, then the median  voter of' period 2 
*  *  -  m  -  is  at  a corner.  He sets  g2 r 1—b and f2  0 if  r  1; and conversely he sets 
0 and f  1-b if  cxrO.  Thus,  if ar1, we  also have Gb  -1 and FbrO  and 
if ci  0, we have Gb r  0 and Fb  -1.  In this case, the income expansion 
path is given by the horizontal  or  vertical axis of Figure  1,  if  cxr1 or ar0, 
respectively. 
3.2  The First Period:  Preliminary  Results 
In period 
1  there  is uncertainty  about the identity of the median  voter 
of  period 2.  As a result,  from the point of view  of  the voters  in period  1, 
the parameter a  in (3) is a random  variable.  The policy most  preferred  by 
the median voter  of period  1  (whose preferences  are denoted by a) can be 
found by solving the following  optimization problem, where E(•) is the 
expectation  operator  over the random variable cx. 
Max  {a  u(g1)+(1-a) u(i-g1+b) 
+ EIc u(G(cz, bfl+(1—a) u(F(a, bfll}  (5) 
g1  ,b 
The current median  voter maximizes  an expected utility function, since he is 
aware that, in the subsequent  period, g2 and f2 will  be chosen by a median 
voter with possibly different  preferences.  The expectation  operator is taken 
with  respect to  all possible  types of future median  voters, knowing how each 
type would behave.  Thus,  today's median voter chooses  the value of the state 
variable b so as to influence  the policy choices of  future median  voters, 
based on the distribution  of  the future preference  parameter, 
The median  voter  of period  1  makes two choices: he  chooses  the 
composition  of' public  goods  in  period 
1  and the amount of  government  borrowing 
(lending).  If 1  >  >  0, the first order condition  relative to g1 is: 
cx1  u'(g1) 
— (1—a)  u'(1-.-b—g1)  0  (6) 
Equation  (6) implicitly  defines  the optimal values g  and f, as a function of 
a  and b: g  g(a,b), f 
r  f(a, b).  Using  the same notation as before, it 
7 f 
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1-b can be shown  that, for 1>a' > 0, 
1  )  >  0 and 1b = i—gb-  If instead 
(or a  0), then the median  voter  in period 
1  is at a corner  and chooses 
respectively f 
= 0 and g 
=  li-b  (or g  0 and f 
r li-b). 
His intertemporal choice  is described by  the first order condition  of 
problem  (5)  relative to  b,  which,  for b <  1,  is: 
a1 u'(g(, 
b)) + E[a u'(G(ci, b)) Gb 
+ (1-at) u'(F(ci,  b))Fb] 
0  (7) 
where it is understood  that Gb and Fb  are functions of 4  and  b.  Despite the 
concavity of  u(-),  the second order  conditions are not satisfied  unless an 
additional,  very mild,  condition  is  imposed.  We assume  throughout  the paper 
that such a condition  is always  satisfied for any value of 4  and 
The interpretation of (7) is straightforward.  The first term  on the left 
hand  side is the marginal gain  of issuing one more  unit  of  debt; at the 
optimum, this must coincide with the marginal utility of spending one extra 
unit on  either of the two public  goods  (good g in (7)).  The second  term of 
(7) is  the expected marginal  disutility  of  having to  repay  the debt, by 
curtailing public  spending tomorrow.  This in turn is computed by  taking  into 
account that the future composition  of  public spending depends on the random 
parameter 4.  The solution  to  equation  (7) determines  the equilibrium  value 
of  debt, b*, chosen by  the median  voter  in period  1. 
In order  to  assess  the sign  of  b*, in the next  subsection  we consider 
equation (7) at the point b=0.  If at  this point equation  (7)  is satisfied, 
then b*  0.  If  instead at b=O the left hand side  of (7) is positive,  then by 
the second order condition  we know that in equilibrium  b*>0.  And conversely, 
if  at brO the left  hand  side  of  is negative, then the second order 
conditions  imply b*<O. 
3.3  The  Equilibrium  Level of Debt 
First of all, consider what  happens if  the median  voter at time  1  is 
certain that he will  also be the median  voter in period  2 (i.e., if  = 4 
with  certainty).  In  this case,  the  second  term  in  (7)  reduces  to 
u'(G(o',b), so that b* r 0 is the only solution  to (7) for any value of 
cz.  This should come  as no  surprise:  since its rate of time discount 
coincides with the real interest rate (they are both zero),  in the absence of 
political uncertainty  the median  voter chooses to spend  an  equal aggregate 
8 amount  in both  periods.  It is easy to show that b*  0 is also the policy 
that would  be chosen  by a benevolent  social planner maximizing  a weighted  sum 
of  individual  utilities  (for any choice of  weights).  Thus, with no 
uncertainty and no  disagreement  between current and future majorities,  the 
political equilibrium  lies on the Pareto frontier.7 
The remainder  of this section investigates  the case in which a  with 
positive probability.  It is convenient to break  down  the second  term on  the 
left hand side of (7) into the weighted average of two conditional 
expectations:  the expectation  conditional on  the event that 1  > a  ) 0; and 
the expectation  conditional on the event that a 
1  or  r 0. 
Consider  this second case first.  Thus,  suppose  that future median  voters 
are expected  to always  be at a corner, so that  they produce only  one kind of 
public good  (only g2 if a  1, and only  f2 if cz 
=  0).  Suppose further that 
with  positive  probability.  We  have: 
Proposition 
1 
If  either a  a 0 or a1 
a 1,  then b* >  0.  Moreover,  b* tends  to be 
greater the larger  is the difference  between a  and the expected value of a. 
Proof: 
Let cz 
= 1  with  probability  ir  and a  a 0 with  probability  1—a,  1)ir>0.  Then, 
using  (6), equation  (7) can be rewritten as: 
a  u'(g) 
- a u'(l-b)  (1-a)u'(f) 
- a  u'(l-b)  a  0  (8) 
where  a a a 
a + 
(1-a)(1-a').  Clearly,  a ￿  Max(a',  (1-a5),  with  strict 
inequality  if  . Moreover, at the point ba0, u'(l—b)  u'(g(a, b)) and 
u'(l—b)  u'(f(a,  b)), with  strict  inequality  if 1>a  > 0.  Hence, at the 
point b=0 the two left hand sides of (8) are always  strictly positive.  As 
argued above, by the second  order conditions  this implies that b*>0. 
In order  to prove the second  part of the Proposition, note  that  the 
expected value of a  here is just  ir.  Fix a, and consider b* as a function  of 
a.  We  have: 
db*  db* da  db*  m  —  —— — r 
(2a1—1). 
(9) 
da  da  dir  da 
9 Applying  the implicit function  theorem to (8),  we  obtain  that  c  0.  Hence, 
do 
as  (10) 
Thus,  if cz' 
> ,  a  lower value  of  n (a  higher  likelihood  that a 
r  0) 
increases bTM.  And conversely,  if cz <  ,  a  higher value of'  i  (a  higher 
likelihood  that  r  1) also  increases  b*.  Hence, b* tends to be larger when 
the difference  between a1  and the expected  value of  is greater.  Q.E.D. 
This result has a simple  intuition.  An increase in debt today implies a 
reduction  of  aggregate  spending  tomorrow.  But since  lies outside the (0,1) 
interval, tomorrow only  one kind of' public  good will  be  provided.  Hence, with 
positive  probability  (and with  probability 
1  if 1  >  > 0), this reduction of 
spending will  affect  only the good that  will have a low marginal utility  from 
the point of view  of today's median  voter.  Thus,  the median  voter of  period  1 
does  not fully internalize  the cost  of issuing debt: he finds it optimal  to 
spend in excess of the current aggregate  endowment.  Moreover,  this incentive 
to borrow  is stronger  the lower  is the marginal utility of the future public 
good.  This  is more likely  to happen if  the future median  jter is more  likely 
to  exhibit very different  tastes  from the current median  voter.  That is, if 
is large and the probability  of  having cz 
1  is small, or viceversa. 
Mext, consider the case in which  lies in the open (0,1) interval. 
With no loss of' generality,  suppose  further that over this interval  is 
distributed  according  to a continuous  probability  function H(), where H(s) 
prob (o ￿ o).  Then (7) can be  rewritten  as: 
rn  *  m  m 
u (g1) 
— v(a2)]dH(o2) 
0  (11) 
where by (14)  and (7), v(cz)  is: 
m  *  *  m  *  * 
o  u'(g  )R(f )  +  (1—a )u'(f )R(g 
v(cz) 
5 
1  2  2  1  2  2  (12) 
R(g2) 
+ 
R(f2) 
and g  G(a, b), f 
a F(a, b).  As  above,  R(•) denotes  the coefficient of 
absolute risk  aversion  of  u(S). 
The appendix  proves  that, at the point brO, a  u'(f) 
— v(a)  > 0 for any 
4  g  a',  if  the utility  function u(.) satisfies  the following  condition:8 
10 u'(x)/R(x)  is increasing  in x, for 1>x>O  (c) 
Hence, under  this condition,  at the point brO the left hand side of (11) (and 
hence of (7)) is  strictly positive.  Thus: 
Proposition 2 
Given  that u  c(0,1), b* >  0 if  Cc) holds 
Next,  let us  define  the probability  distribution  H(ci) as  "more 
polarized"  than the distribution k'(c)  if,  for any continuous  increasing 
function f(.), the following  condition  is satisfied: 
S 
> f  f(I-l)dK()  (13) 
That  is, a more  polarized probability  distribution assigns more weight to 
values of  that are further apart  from c.  The appendix also proves  that, 
if condition  (c)  holds,  then for any b>0, the expression  [s' u'(g) — 
is an increasing  function of  - c (strictly increasing  if  — l>0). 
Then, using  (11) and appealing  to  the second  order conditions, we also  have:9 
Proposition  3 
Under  the same conditions  of  Proposition  2, b* is larger  the more polarized 
is the probability  distribution  of  over  the interval  (0,1). 
If  u'(x)/R(x)  is everywhere  decreasing  (constant)  for 1>x>O,  then 
Propositions  2 and 3 hold  in  reverse: b* <0 (b*rO) and b* is more negative  if 
is more polarized.  If  u'(x)/R(x)  is not monotonic  over  1>x>0,  then the 
sign  of b* is ambiguous. 
Condition  Cc)  is stronger then  decreasing  absolute risk aversion:  it says 
that the coefficient of absolute  risk aversion,  R, must  fall more  rapidly than 
marginal utility  as x increases.  Nonetheless,  this condition  is satisfied  for 
a large class  of  utility functions,  such  as any member of  the HARA class which 
also  has decreasing  absolute  risk aversion.  This  family  includes commonly 
used  utility  functions,  like the power  function. 
In order  to gain  an  intuitive  understanding  of  the role played  by 
condition  (c), consider  the diagram  of Figure 2.  The downward sloping line 
11 denotes the opportunity  set faced by the median  voters in both periods  if 
brO.  A positive value of b shifts  this line to  the right in period  1, and to 
the left in period  2.  A  and B denote  the points  chosen  in periods  1  and 2 by 
the median  voters of type a  and c  respectively, again for brO.  For 
concreteness,  it has been  assumed that  >  ) 
cx.  The indifference curves 
for the median  voter of type ci in  periods 
1  and 2 are labelled  I  and  II 
respectively.  Finally, the upwards sloping lines EP1 and EP2 denote  the income 
expansion  paths of  types ci  and a.  As  noted  in Section  3.1,  their divergent 
slopes reflects  the assumption  of  decreasing  absolute risk aversion.  Thus, 
decreasing  absolute risk  aversion  implies that the divergence between the 
choices of the two types of  median  voter (points A and B) increases with 
income.  To  put it  differently, with  decreasing  absolute risk aversion, 
disagreement  concerning  the optimal composition of  g and f is a luxury  good: it 
grows with  the overall size  of  public  spending.10 
The ambiguity  in  the sign  of b*  for 1>m>O  is due to  the opposite 
influence of the two following countervailing  forces.  By  running a surplus 
(by setting b<O),  the median voter  in period  1 moves  A to  the left  along EP 
and B to  the right along EP2; this has the effect  of reducing the distance 
between the indifference curves  labeled  I  and II.  Hence, setting b<O "buys 
insurance" for the median voter  of  period  1,  in the sense that it tends  to 
equalize the level of  utility in  the two periods.  This is the force that  works 
in the direction  of  making  b<0 more  desirable. 
On the other  hand, by running a deficit  (by setting b>O),  the median 
voter of period  1 moves  B to the left along EP2.  Since the slopes of  EP1 and 
EP1 are divergent,  this has the effect of  moving  point B closer  to point  A; 
that is, it moves  the future composition of  public spending towards the point 
that  is preferred  by today's median  voter.  This is the force that provides the 
incentive to  issue public  debt today. 
Condition  (c)  guarantees  that this  second effect prevails over  the first 
one.  This  condition  is more  likely  to be satisfied  if  the slopes of EP1 and 
EP2  are very  divergent  from  each  other  (that is, if the coefficient  of 
absolute  risk aversion  is  decreasing  very rapidly); or if  the indifference 
curves  are very  flat (that is if  the utility function is not very concave), 
because  in this case the indifference curves  labeled  I  and II are already close 
to one  another. 
Combining  the results of  Propositions  1—3,  we  can conclude  that a 
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mpositive equilibrium  level of  debt is more  likely  if: 1) the future median 
voter  is likely  to have extreme preferences and be at  a corner  (i.e., 
(0,1)  is likely); or ii) condition (C) on  u(•) is likely  to be 
satisfied.  Moreover,  in both cases,  the size  of debt  is larger  the greater is 
the probability  mass assigned to  values of  that are very different from 
that is,  using the previous terminology, the more  polarized  is the 
distribution of  the future median voters preferences. 
It is worth noting  that,  in a sense,  (1) is  the limit case  of  case  (ii); 
if the future median voter is at a corner,  then its income expansion  path 
coincides with either  the vertical or the horizontal axis.  With  reference  to 
Figure 2,  then, leaving some debt  to  the future has always the effect of 
moving  the future composition of  public  spending in the desired direction,  as 
in the less extreme case (ii). 
Furthermore,  in a more general model,  the future median  voter could find 
itself at a corner  even for values of ci  belonging  to the interior of  the 
[0,11 interval.  For instance, this would happen  if  the utility function u(•) 
did not satisfy the Inada conditions, so  that the indifference curve of Figure 
1  could intersect either  the horizontal or the vertical axis.  Alternatively, 
it could happen  if the public goods g and f had to be  provided  in some  minimum 
positive amounts (for instance, because of  survival reasons): in  this case 
too, the future decisionmaker  could find itself  at a corner with  respect to 
either g2 or  f2, despite the fact that  0.  '"he  expectation of this 
event,  in turn, would  induce the current median voter  to run a budget  deficit, 
Just like in the case of  Proposition  1.  Obviously,  this event would be more 
likely to  happen  the closer is  to either 0 or  1.11 
3.4 Positive Implications 
Propositions  1—3 relate the size  of  budget deficits  to the instability of 
the median voter's preferences  over time.  This type of  instability  depends 
upon the distribution  of individual preferences  within  society.  In the 
remainder of  this section we show  that, the more "homnogenous"  are the 
preferences of different  individuals, ceteris paribus the more stable are the 
median  voter preferences  over time. 
Consider a family of  density functions  indexed by c,  y(a,c).  For a given 
c,  let y(ci,e) be the frequency distribution of a over the [0,11 interval, 
where  a is  the parameter'  that summarizes  the preferences of a specific 
13 individual  in equation (2).  Different density functions are associated  to 
different values of c.  Thus, c can be thought of  as a perturbation  of the 
distribution  of  the voters  preferences,  associated with  random shocks  to the 
voting participation  or to the eligibility  of' the voting population. 
To  any realization of C is associated  a value of  the median  voter's 
preferences,  m(C), defined implicitly  by: 
f y(a,c)da - 1/2  0 
The extent  to which m  varies as  takes different  values depends on  the 
properties of the density function  y(ci,c).  Specifically,  applying  the 
implicit function theorem to (1!!) one obtains: 
dm  = - j  y(a,c)dci 
y(a ,€) 
where  yE(a,e)  The numerator  of (15)  is the area  underneath  the 
density function  that is shifted from one side to the other  of  cim as  c  a 
dci 
varies.  According to (15), for a given value of  the numerator,  the term 
is  larger  in absolute value  the smaller  is  That is,  if  there are 
relatively  few individuals  in the population  that share  the median  voter's 
preferences  (i.e.:  if'  1(m,C)  is small for all C),  then m  tends to  vary a lot 
as  the distribution  is perturbed  by  random shocks.  Conversely,  if the median 
voter preferences  are representative  of a large part of the population,  (i.e.: 
if y(a,) is large), then m  tends to be  stable even in  the face of' large 
perturbations  to  the underlying  distribution  of  voters preferences. 
This  result  is illustrated  in Figure 3.  Consider  the top distribution 
first.  When e goes  from  to 
ci,  a fraction of individuals  corresponding  to 
the area  A is  moved  from  the right to the left  of a  m(C0),  to the area  A' 
r A.  This area is the numerator  of (15).  The new median  voter, a 
r 
is  found by  equating  the area  between ci  and a, B, to the area  A.  Consider 
now repeating  the same  perturbation  to the distribution  in the bottom  of 
Figure 3. Clearly,  the same  area  B now corresponds to a much  larger horizontal 
distance between cz and a: since  the frequency of  the population  around m  is 
relatively  small,  the median  voter's preferences here  have to shift  by much .
—
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Imore than in the ease of  the top distribution of  Figure  3.  This is the sense 
in which a more  polarized distribution  of  societies preferences  (such as in 
the bottom  of Figure  3) tends to be  associated with  more instability and aore 
polarization  in  the induced probability  distribution of the median  voter's 
preferences. 
These  considerations  are suggestive of an empirically testable 
interpretation  for the results of Propositions  1-3.  Namely, that more 
polarized  and unstable societies  have  larger budget deficits than more 
homogeneous  societies.  As  suggested  by the foregoing discussion,  in a more 
polarized  and unstable  political  system there is a higher probability that 
future maJorities  will choose policies  that are very  different from those 
chosen by  today's majority.  And according to Propositions  1-3,  it is 
precisely  in this  case that the current majority is in favor of  budget 
deficits.  Moreover,  according  to  Proposition  1.  debt is more likely to be 
issued when the future majorities  are likely tn have  extreme preferences  (for 
then the likelihood  of  being at a corner  is greater).  Finally, note  that  even 
condition  (c) itself  (which implies  that debt will always  be issued  in the 
presenen.  of political uncertainty)  can be interpreted as an instance of 
polarization:  if the utility  function u(.) satisfies condition  Cc),  then 
different  types of median  voters  have divergent income expansion paths.  In 
this case,  current and future majorities  tend to  choose different policies  in 
the following  sense:  they allocate  changes in their budget  (cuts or 
increments) to very different  items.  According to  Proposition  2, this kind of 
"incremental'!  polarization  always  creates incentives in favor of issuing 
public debt. 
k.  CONSTITUTIONAL  CONSTRAINTS ON  THE BUDGET  DEFICIT 
The previous  results state  that in  equilibrium a majority of  the voters 
may be in favor of a budget deficit.  This section investigates the efficiency 
properties  of this equilibrium. 
Section  3•1 showed  that  a social planner certain of being reappointed 
would always  choose  b*rO, for any weighting of individual preferences.  That 
is, a balanced  budget  is always  a component of the first best policy.  On this 
ground, it is tempting to  conclude  that a budget deficit is inefficient in 
this model.  However,  this argument  would be  wrong, or at  least misleading. 
15 By assumption, a social  planner can precommit to  choosing the composition  of 
both periods  1  and 2 public  goods according to a stable social welfare 
function.  This assumption  is violated in the political equilibrium of the 
model and in any real world  political  regime: the current majority  cannot 
precommit  the spending choices of  future majorities.  In other words,  the 
solution  to  the social planners optimum  is not necessarily  the optimal social 
contract  to write for a group of individuals who cannot also precommit  the 
expenditure  choices of  future governments. 
In order  to characterize  such  an  optimal social contract consider  the 
following  conceptual  experiment.  Suppose that the collective decision  prccess 
in  period 
1  is separated  in two stages.  First the group chooses a level of 
debt, b.  Then it chooses the composition of  the public good in terms of  g1 
and f1.  The decision taken at this second  stage depends on the value of a for 
the median  voter, a, as in equation  (6).  Suppose further that at the first 
stage, when  choosing  b,  the group  ignores the value of ci  corresponding  to  the 
second stage.  That is,  suppose that the decision concerning b is taken behind 
a "veil of  ignorance"  about  the outcome of the second stage.  We can think of 
a constitutional  amendment  on the size of budget deficits as being chosen  in 
this way)2  Under these hypothesis,  the optimal level of  b for agent  i  is 
determined  as  the solution  to  the following problem: 
Max 
E(m1[u(g(a',  b)+u(G(a, bfll+ (1—a')[u(f(a,b))+u(F(cz,  b))]}  (1Z1) 
b 
where  E is the expectations  operator  with respect to  the random variables 
and  and where g(.),  f(S), G()  are defined  implicitly by (6) and (3)  of 
the previous  section.  If cz  and  are drawn from the same prior 
distribution,  then it is easy to show that the only solution to (111)  is brO, 
for any value of  cz1.13  Thus, using  the terminology of  Holmstrom-Myerson 
(1983), we can conclude  that  a balanced budget rule is "ex-ante efficient": 
before  knowing the identity of the current majority,  the group is  unanimous  in 
favoring a balanced budget  amendment.1 
If  however the value of a  corresponding  to  the second stage  is known 
when choosing b, then we are back  in  the equilibrium  examined in  the previous 
section,  where a majority might  support a deficit and oppose  the balanced 
16 budget  amendment.  In other words,  each current majority  generally does net 
want to be bound by the amendment,  even though it wants  such an  amendment  for 
all future majorities.  Thus, such an amendment  can be  approved only  if it 
does not bind the current majority.  However, a budget amendment taking  effect 
at  some prespecified  future date would  be irrelevant: if  one needs only a 
simple majority  to  abrogate the rule, then any future majority would  follow 
the policy  described  in Section 3 and would abrogate  the amendment.  Using 
again the terminology of  Holmstrom—Myerson  (1983), we can conclude  that a 
balanced budget  amendment,  though ex-ante efficient,  is not "durable" under 
majority rule. 
This problem could be overcome  by  requiring a qualified majority to 
abrogate the amendment.  But this  requirement  would eliminate  the flexibility 
that may be needed to respond to Lnexpected  and exceptional  events. 
Obviously,  a budget  rule could be  contingent  on  prespeoified events, such  as 
cyclical fluctuations  of tax revenues or "wars."  However, since it is very 
diffioult,  or even impossible, to list  all the relevant contingencies,  it 
might  be  desirable  to retain some degree  of  flexibility.  Thus,  requiring a 
very iarge majority  to abandon (even ;emporarily) the budget  balance 
constraint  may be  counterproductive. 
These normative  results may contribute  to  explain the empirical 
observation  that the majority of  voters  seems to generally favor an  abstraot 
notion  of balanced budgets, even though when choosing specific policies  it 
votes  in favor  of budget  deficits (see the literature  quoted in footnote  1). 
Balance budgets are ex-ante efficient.  Therefore,  the majority of voters, 
asked  in a poll if  they would like  a balanced budget constitutional  amendment, 
would answer  "yes."  However the same  majority of  voters may choose  to run a 
budget  deficit  in the current period,  if uncertain about  the preferences of 
future  majorities. 
More  generally,  these results suggest the desirability of institutions 
that  would  enable  society to  separate  its intertemporal choices from  decisions 
concerning  the allocation  of  resources  within any given period.  In evaluating 
such  institutions,  there seems to be an inescapable conflict between the goal 
of preserving  sufficient  flexibility  to meet  unexpected  contingencies,  and the 
oonstraints  imposed by the requirement of  enforcing this separation. 
17 5.  SUMMARY AND EXTENSIONS 
This  paper  shows that disagreement  between current and future voters 
about  the composition of  public expenditure  generates a suboptimal path of' 
public  debt.  Public debt becomes the legacy  left by today's voters to  the 
future, so as to influence the choices of  future  voters.  This legacy tends to 
increase with the likelihood of  disagreement between current and future 
voters.  Thus,  this paper establishes a precise link between political 
polarization  and budget deficits.  Political polarization can be  interpreted 
as a situation where  the preferences of future majorities  can be very 
different  from the preferences of  today's majority.  This  can occur if a 
government  with  extreme preferences  (relative to the historical average) wins 
the temporary  support of a majority of  the voters.  Alternatively,  it can 
occur  in political systems where parties with  very different preferences  are 
equally likely to  obtain a  majority.  Thus,  the implications of  this paper are 
in principle  testable against either time series or cross sectional data. 
Perhaps  the most natural empirical work  along these lines would be a cross 
sectional  comparison  of  the deficit policies of countries governed by 
different  political  institutions and with different degrees of  political 
conflict. 
The model  presented  in this paper can be  generalized  in several 
directions.  First of  all, the restriction to  only two types of  public goods 
is made  only for simplicity.  Enlarging the set of  public goods presents only 
one difficulty:  it implies an increase of  the dimensionality of  the parameter 
space over  which different  voters disagree.  This complicates  the description 
of the collective  decision problem.  However, this  difficulty can be  overcome 
by  either  imposing special assumptions  on the distribution of  voters over this 
larger  dimensional  space -— for  instance by assuming  the existence of' a 
"median—in—all—directions",  as in Davis—Degroot—Hinich  (1972); or by requiring 
a super—majority  vote to change  the status-quo, as  in Caplin-alebuff 
(1988).  Under  either  of these assumptions,  the results of the previous 
sections  could be extended to  the case  of  more than two public goods. 
Secondly,  the model could be  extended to the infinite horizon, by 
applying  the dynamic programming  solution procedure presented  in Alesina— 
Tabellini  (1987a).  In an  infinite horizon model one could also  study the 
possibility  of  cooperation  between current and future median voters, for 
18 instance based  upon trigger strategy  equilibria.  In these equilibria  the path 
of'  the  public debt  could be  brought arbitrarily  close to the socially 
efficient  value.  However, in  order  to obtain  the socially efficient solution 
one needs cooperation  between successive  median voters: cooperation amongst 
different  voters within  the same  time  period would not solve the intertemporal 
distortions  that are the focus of this paper.  As  such, the reputation 
mechanism  that  would be  needed  to enforce cooperation  might require 
substantial  amounts of coordination.  In addition, with  discounting of the 
future, the qualitative  implications o  reputational equilibria may be similar 
to  those of the equilibrium  studied in  the present paper.5 
Finally,  a natural and yet difficult  extension of  the basic model would 
be to  allow  the voters to choose Thether or not to  repudiate the debt. 
Indeed, the results of this paper are driven by  a fundamental asymmetry  in the 
commitment  technologies available  to  the voters: even though current voters 
cannot  bind the spending choices of future majc.rities,  nonetheless  they are 
assumed to be able  to  force  future majorities  to honor  their debt  obligations. 
This  asymmetry  seems to  faithfully  reflect a feature of  the real world,  at 
least in industrialized  economies  during  the recent decades.  Eut still,  the 
puzzle remains of what  is the source  of  this asymmetry.  Some  recent 
interesting  literature  has investigated the idea that reputational mechanisms 
create  incentives in  favor of  honoring  the internal debt obligations of 
previous governments  (see in particular  Grossman—Van Huyck  (1987a)).16  The 
political economy approach  of  this paper suggests a second  line of  attack: 
domestic debt  repudiation may not be politically viable, because it would be 
strenuously  opposed by  the private sector holders of  the debt.  Recent 
accounts of  historical  episodes  of  debt repayments  in Europe during  the 
iriterwar  period  lend support  to this  view (see for instance Alesina 
(1988b)).  Further  investigation of this line of  thought sets an exciting task 
for future research. 
19 FOOTNOTES 
1.  Both  recent  polls  (New  York  Times, November  1987) and polls  taken in the 
early eighties  (Blinder—Holtz Eakin  (1983)) show that a large majority 
of  American  voters  is  in favor of budget balance  aniendrnents.  A much 
lower fraction of voters is in favor of any specific measure  to  reduce 
budget  deficits and there is disagreement on  which expenditures  (taxes) 
to  reduce  (increase),  if  any. 
2.  For recent  arguments explaining  the deficit as the result of "fiscal 
illusion",  see Buchanan et. al. (1987) and the references quoted 
therein. Rogoff-Sibert  (1988) and Rogoff (1987) have shown that 
suboptimal budget  deficits may be  observed  before elections  if voters 
are rational but  imperfectly informed. This mechanism can explain short 
budget cycles  around elections,  but it cannot  explain long lasting and 
large budget deficits which go  well beyond  the electoral cycle. 
3.  One interpretation  of this model  is that each member  of the group  is 
taxed identically  and the total amount of tax revenues is exogenously 
given.  For a model  with similar features,  in which distortionary  taxes 
and private consumption  are endogenously determined,  see Alesina 
Tabellini  (1987a).  By following the same procedures used in that paper, 
the present model  can be extended to incorporate  endogenous  taxation 
with  no  qualitative  changes in the results. 
14•  Any  expected  utility  function  that  is linear  in a vector of parameters 
belongs to this class.  Even  though  linearity was not essential  in 
Grandmont  (1978), it is essential  here, since we deal with  an  expected 
utility function.  There  are families of  preferences  which do not admit 
linear representation  and yet are intermediate  preferences.  However,  in 
the absence of  linearity  in the vector of  parameters,  the property  of 
intermediate preferences  would not necessarily  be  preserved by the 
expectations operator.  The essential  property of  intermediate 
preferences  is that supporters  of  distinct  proposals are divided by a 
hyperplane  in  the space of  most preferred points.  See Grandmont  (1978) 
and also  Caplin-Nalebuff  (1988). 
5.  This setting is reminiscent of that analyzed  in Strotz  (1956), where  a 
consumer with  time inconsistent preferences  solves a dynamic opti- 
mization problem.  See also Peleg and Yaari  (1973) and the references 
20 quoted  therein.  In those papers, like here, the time consistent 
solution  is described as the non cooperative equilibriL!n  of a game 
played  by successive decision makers. 
6.  This second order  sufficient condition can be  stated as follows: 
R(f2)3R(g2)+R(g2)2R(f2)2+( 1—y)R'(g2)R(f2)2+ 
(F.1) 
+yR(g2)3R(f2)+yR(g2YR(I2)2+(y—l )R'(f2)R(g2)2>0 
m  rn 
1-.m  1-a 
where  y  —  —  and  where R() r -u"()/u'()  is  the coefficient 
of  absolute  risk aversion of  u(S).  In turn, a sufficient  (but not 
necessary)  condition  for (F,1) to  hold is that: 
R(f2)R(g2)+R(g2)2+R(g2) 
>  0 
and 
R(f2)R(g2)+R(f2)2+R(f2 >  0 
7.  in a more general framework,  the socially optimal policy might imply 
running a deficit or a surplus  (for instance, to smooth  tax distortions 
over time, as in Barro  (1979) and Lucas-Stokey  (1983)).  Here,  for 
simplicity, we  abstract  from these complications. 
8.  This  condition  can also be  stated as: 
ü"'(x)  >  2[u'(x)]2/u'(x),  1>x>O 
or 
R'(x)  R2(x)  <  0,  1>x>O. 
9.  The same results would  go  through if the definition of "more polarized 
in (13) was stated with  respect to other measures  of  distance between 
and a, such  as  euclidean  norm  or (& 
— 
10.  This  implication of' decreasing  absolute risk aversion would  remain  true 
even if points  A and B lied on the same half  of the budget  line (that 
is,  if' either a, 4 
> ,  or a,  4 
<  ), as  long as  4. 
11.  These generalizations  however would  introduce an additional  compli- 
cation. Namely, the probability  that the future  decisioninaker  will be at 
a corner  could now be endogenous,  and in particular  depend  on the 
borrowing  policies of' previous governments.  This  would  add another 
21 dimension  to the problem  of'  choosing the optimal debt policy. 
12.  The notion that optimal  social contracts may be thought of' as being 
chosen under a "veil of ignorance" concerning  how the policy  game is 
played  in subsequent  stages  is due to Rawls (1971) and Buchanan-Tullock 
(1962). 
13.  If  and  have the same  probability  distribution,  say H(), then the 
first order condition of (V1) with respect to  b can be  written as: 
a'J[u'(g(a,b))g(a,b) + u'(G(a,b))Gb(a,b)JdH(a) 
+ 
+(1_01)  f[u'(f(a,b)fb(a,b) 
+  u'(F(o,b))Fb(m,bfldH(a) 
r 0 
It can be shown that  if b0, then the terms inside each integral sum to 
zero.  Hence, by the second order conditions, b0  is the solution to 
(14). 
111.  Unanimity would  be lost  if the distributions  of  and  in (14) were 
different from  each  other. 
15.  Alesina (1987), (1988a)  investigates the properties  of  these 
reputational  equilibria  in a repeated static  game played by  two randcily 
alternating  policyrnakers. 
16.  P. much  larger  literature  has  investigated  the  problem  of  external debt 
repudiation,  for instance Sachs  (385), Bulow—Rogoff  (1987), Grossman- 
Van Huyck  (1987b). 
22 APPENDIX 
Consider  the function v(a)  for a given value of b.  This function  is 
continuous  in i>oC  (sircu ci') was assumed  to be twice continuously 
differentiable).  After acme algebra, v'(l) simplifies  to: 
m  S 
*  1—cs1  1—cs 
I  (__  *  ui.  - 
2  m  om  dg 
01  2  2 
V.s2jr—  *  *  2 
LR(g,)+rt(f2)]  do2 
* 
dg_ 
where  —s  >0  and  (A.1) 
m 
do2 
*  *2  *  C  *)  * 
A  Rig2i[R(f2) 
+ 
R(f2)]  R(f2)[R(g+R'(gJ] 
If u1x)/R(x) is increasing  in x for 1>x>0, (see also footnote 8), then MO. 
Hence, for any o: 
m  >  m<  S 
v o2)  0  as  02  a,  (Ac) 
if (ci  holds.  These properties  imply that, under  (c), v(o) reaches a maximum 
at  the point o  m, and is strictly decreasing  in  o—aI  if o  o. Hence, 
for given aT  and given b,  the expression  [oT u'(g1)  — v(m)] reaches a minimum 
at o;  c o  and is strictly  increasing  in ja—oTI if a  i o. 
Consider  now this  expression  at the point  brO. Thediscussion on  p. 8 of 
the rext implies that, at  brO, ou'(g1) 
— v(oT)  0. Since, as  shown above, 
under (c) aT r argmin v(4), we have  that,  if brO: 
aT  u'(g1) 
- v(o) ? 0 
with strict  inequality  if o  i  Thus,  under condition  (c)  if  u'(x)/R(x)  is 
increasing in x, v(4) can be  drawn as in the diagram of  Figure  (4). 
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